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The Royal Malaysian Navy, and Malaysia’s Strategic Maritime Environment

First published: 22nd January 2017 | Imran Shamsunahar

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From a regional perspective, the Royal Malaysian Navy is a relatively capable and modern naval force in Southeast Asia, albeit facing great challenges in terms of both declining defense budgets and a worsening maritime neighborhood. The latter involves traditional interstate threats revolving around territorial disputes (namely that of the South China Sea), as well as more ‘non-traditional’ maritime issues which bedevil Malaysia, including piracy, militant groups, and terrorism. Hindered by limited funds and aging surface ships, the RMN has had to adopt innovative policies to ensure Malaysia maintains a balanced and flexible fleet designed for both conventional deterrence as well as day-to-day maritime security for the country’s extensive coastline (estimated at 4700 km), numerous offshore assets, and sea-lanes of communications (SLOCs) [1] [2].

 

Malaysia’s strategic maritime environment

Malaysia’s unique geography ensures that the maritime environment will play a substantial part in any major decision made by Kuala Lumpur in regards to security and national defense. The country is effectively split into two halves by the South China Sea, that of Peninsular Malaysia in the West, and Malaysian Borneo in the East. At the narrowest point, the distance between both halves is approximately 600 km, while measuring1,600 km at its widest. This creates an issue for the Royal Malaysian Armed Forces (RMAF), which find themselves having to split their limited forces between them [3].

This is a division which is not only simply geographical in nature, but also socio-economic and cultural. West Malaysia is the ‘demographic, political, economic and military core of Malaysia’, with East Malaysia largely isolated from these developments. This has created a sense of alienation and frustration among many East Malaysians, who feel that their impoverished states have been neglected. For a country which tends to be extremely sensitive to maintaining racial harmony among the country’s diverse populace, this creates a strategic imperative to ensuring that Malaysia’s maritime sovereignty and the access it provides is maintained [4].

The Royal Malaysian Navy’s Fleet Command Headquaters is located at RMN Lemut, located in the state of Perak. It currently has three main operational area commands, responsible for specific bodies of water. COMNAV I is located in Kuantan, and is responsible for the East Coast of Peninsular Malaysia, a portion of Malaysia’s EEZ in the South China Sea, and the Singapore Straits. COMNAV II is located in RMN Seppangar, and is responsible for the coastline and waters of East Malaysia, including the country’s EEZ which stretches into the South China Sea. Finally, COMNAV III is located in RMN Langkawi, and is responsible for Peninsular Malaysia’s west coast and the vital Malacca Straits. The navy’s two Scorpene submarines are hosted in RMN Seppangar, alongside Submarine Command, which is responsible for both the operations of the submarines and the training of its crew [5].

The presence of the main headquarters of the RMN at Lemut is indicative of the west-centric focus of the RMN for the longest time. This certainly would have made sense when piracy in the Malacca Straits caught world attention, but scholars nowadays suggest that it is in East Malaysia where Kuala Lumpur will be facing their main security challenges in the coming years. These challenges can be broken down into two main areas, that of inter-state territorial disputes in the South China Sea, as well as rising trans-national threats emanating from the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea off the Sabahan coast, including terrorism, piracy, and militant groups.

 

Looking East: The South China Sea dispute

Recent developments in the East has persuaded Kuala Lumpur that the main focus of their military attention in the coming years will be eastwards. As mentioned above, said developments can be broken down into two main areas: that of inter-state territorial disputes and aggression from trans-national non-state actors. The former largely revolves around the South China Sea dispute. Malaysia is a passive player in the South China Sea dispute, laying claim to a portion of the Spratly Archipelago and its surrounding waters, and currently occupies five features within it. The most notable of these features, Pulau Layang-Layang (Swallow Reef), a reclaimed island which currently hosts a naval base for the RMN’s patrol crafts as well as a runway capable of supporting a C-130 aircraft. Kuala Lumpur has become increasingly concerned about China’s increasingly aggressive acquisition of more maritime territory in the SCS, seen most evidently in its extensive land reclamation works and militarization of certain features within the sea in the last few years [6].

As noted by Malaysian strategic scholar Elina Noor, the importance of the South China Sea for Malaysia is two fold. As noted above, the South China Sea effectively splits both halves of Malaysia, and it is thus imperative for the RMAF to maintain access to ensure territorial integrity. As well, the South China Sea has huge economic importance for Malaysia due to its supposed abundance of natural resources, most notably energy. It is believed that the Spratly Islands alone hold between 4 – 6 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas. Malaysia at this point holds the fourth largest source of natural gas reserves in the world, at 83 tcf. However, the country’s production rate has decreased substantially in the last couple of years, with its reserves expected to last 36 years based on its production rate in 2008, a decrease from 51.2 years at its 2002 rate of production [7].

At these rates Malaysia is expected to become a net energy importer by the middle of this decade, which wouldn’t bode well for a country where the energy sector accounts for 40% of Malaysia’s revenue. There is thus a huge economic imperative for Malaysia to ensure continued access to the South China Sea and its energy reserves, which Kuala Lumpur hopes can help slow down the declining trend in the country’s reserves and boost national income. Indeed, an informative online map on the website of think tank Centre for Strategic and International Studies noted that most of oil and gas rich areas of the South China Sea (both proven and probable) fall within the waters north of East Malaysia and Brunei [8]. Although the RMN would stand no chance toe-to-toe against China’s People Liberation Army Navy, it would be prudent for Malaysia to ensure a minimum credible deterrence against possible future Chinese encroachments into Malaysian waters.

 

The Sulu-Sulawesi Sea

Besides the more ‘traditional’ challenges of state-on-state rivalries over territory, Malaysia’s East is also experiencing more direct threats from maritime-based non-state actors. This was certainly true in the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea, the one million square kilometer body of water which borders Malaysia, Indonesia, and the southern Philippines. The sea had seen a recent upsurge in kidnappings of Malaysian and Indonesian citizens by Abu Sayyaf, a militant group based in the southern Philippines. The group itself is part of a larger phenomenon of jihadi groups operating in the generally lawless southern Philippines. Besides the presence of Abu Sayyaf in the Sulu Archipelago, there is also the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in Mindanao province to contend with. Current worries about the possibility of ISIS establishing a foothold in the Philippines has increased the imperative to bring order to the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea [9].

Although this sea has always been a rather lawless area, due to the presence of grinding poverty on its shores and the absent of effective government, the recent upsurge in violence has become more apparent recently. The sea holds huge strategic importance for its neighbors, with an article in The Diplomat noting that ‘every year more than 100,000 ships pass through the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas carrying 55 million metric tons of cargo and 18 million passengers’ [10]. It is estimated that over $40 billion worth of cargo passes through the Sulu Sea annually, and it is vital for a region suffering from a slowing Chinese economy to ensure intra-regional trade is maintained. To give an example of how damaging piracy in the sea can be, consider that in the beginning of this year Jakarta had to enforce a moratorium on coal shipment to the Philippines (valued at $700-800 million annually), but eventually reversed course after the economic loss was too great [11].

Lawlessness in the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea has not only affected Malaysia’ economy, but also very sovereignty. On February 11 2013, around 200 armed Filipino followers of Jamalul Kiram III, the self-proclaimed Sultan of Sulu, landed in the district of Lahad Datu, in Sabah state, to press their ancestral claims to disputed land in Northern Borneo, whom they believed rightfully belongs to Kiram III. After several weeks of fruitless negotiations with Malaysian authorities, Malaysian forces were sent in to clear them out. Although the invasion force was effectively neutralized, the resulting firefight cost the lives of ten Malaysian security forces, as well as six civilians. The standoff caused public outcry in Malaysia, with many suspecting that the militants were able to infiltrate Sabah as easily as they did due to lax enforcement in the area [12] [13].

 

Militarization of the East

Given the increasing maritime challenges facing Malaysia in their eastern territories, there are already indications of an eastward shifts in Malaysia’s military efforts in recent years. As mentioned above, Malaysia has agreed in August of 2016 to coordinated maritime patrols (in which each country would patrol within their respective borders) in the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea alongside Indonesia and the Philippines. The specific details on the how the patrols would take shape were agreed upon in an earlier meeting in May, where among the things discussed included areas ‘such as standard operating procedures, communications, and intelligence-sharing.’ There was also reportedly agreement on the establishment of command posts in each respective country to facilitate intelligence sharing and coordination [14].

We have also seen an increasing shift in military resources into East Malaysia by Kuala Lumpur. The most notable of them was the decision to permanently base Malaysia’s recently acquired Scorpene submarines in COMNAV II, at RMN Seppangar. The decision to base Malaysia’s most modern naval equipment in Sarawak was obviously heavily influenced by the proximity of the base to the South China Sea. The importance of the base can be ascertained by an announcement by Defense Minister Hishammuddin Hussein in early 2015 that the government is considering placing an air defense system at the port (although there has been little news concerning this since then) [15].

More recent news concerns the possibility of a new naval base being opened in the port city of Bintulu, in Sarawak. Noted for its oil wealth, in May 6th of this year Hishammuddin noted that the port would be part of a larger effort to ‘strengthen the maritime defense of Sarawak’, and that it offers a strategic location, as it is ‘protected from big waves and strong winds’ [16]. An article in the Borneo Bulletin noted that there were plans to establish a forward base from a decommissioned oil platform in Bintulu to save costs, and that said platform would be able to station drones, helicopters, and special forces [17].

 

Malaysia’s naval capabilities and future developments

The RMN is considered a relatively capable force within the region. However, as Malaysia grapples with an increasingly dangerous maritime neighborhood, Kuala Lumpur has sought to modernize its ageing fleet to ensure adequate capabilities in both conventional deterrence and maintaining good order at sea. Facing tightening budgets over the years, the RMN has been forced to adopt innovative approaches to ensure its strategic ambitions are met. This section intends to look at the principal surface and sub-surface combatants of the RMN both currently and in future acquisitions.

The current bulk of the RMN’s firepower is provided by its two Lekiu class frigates. These British built frigates were commissioned in 1999, and displace 2270 tons. They are armed with eight Exocet anti-ship missiles, sixteen Sea Wolf surface-to-air missiles, as well as a hangar for a Westland Super Lynx anti-submarine helicopter. Plans to augment the Lekiu class (this time locally built) with two more frigates were floated in 2006, but eventually shelved in 2009 due to cost [18]. Instead, the two remaining frigates are currently undergoing a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) to maintain adequate performance, including acquiring new radar systems [19] [20].

Besides the frigates, the RMN currently operates six corvettes, four Laksamana class and two Kasturi class. The Laksamana class displace 675 tons, and carry six Otomat anti-ship and twelve Aspide surface-to-air missiles. These Italian ships were originally built for the Iraqi Navy, but embargoed after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The RMN acquire these four ships in 1997 and 1999 respectively. The Kasturi class are larger, armed with Exocet anti-ship missiles, but lack anti-air defenses. These are probably the oldest ships in the fleet, having been commissioned in 1984 [21]. The Kasturi class went through an upgrade in 2009 to remain in service to 2020 [22]. The Laksamana corvettes were also expected to go through SLEP, but there has been no news to this effect as of yet.

To aid Malaysia’ patrolling efforts, in 2000 the RMN decided to purchase six Kedah class offshore patrol vessels (also known as the New Generation Patrol Vessel), commissioning them from 2006 to 2010. Displacing 1850 tons, the Malaysian built ships were based on the German MEKO 100 family of vessels. Although the ships can carry two Bravo or Seahawk helicopters, they lack meaningful armaments, including SAM and SSMs [23]. This is because the ships were built with the ‘plug and play’ concept. To keep costs down, the ships were commissioned fitted for but without any advanced weaponry. The idea is that said missiles can be purchased in a later date, thereby allowing the ships to be equipment with the necessary combat materials depending on the environment they are operating in [24] [25]. However, there is still no news about when exactly the Malaysian government plans to acquire them. Until then, as one naval blog noted, these ships are effectively oversized gunboats, more effective for low-key patrol duties rather than for conventional deterrence [26]. Given the aforementioned concerns about more lower-level maritime threats, the Kedah class would still probably prove useful in this regard.

One of the RMN’s most modern assets at hand currently are its two French-built Scorpene submarines, both commissioned in 2009. These submarines are classified as Perdana Menteri-class submarines, and were acquired to boost the conventional deterrence value of the RMN. As mentioned above, the decision to base these submarines near the South China Sea was strategic in choice. The submarines in question were custom made to operate in the warmer and more saline waters of Southeast Asia, and can be armed with 18 missiles, including the SM-39 Exocet anti-ship missile [27].

 

Future Acquisitions

Future acquisitions by the RMN will mostly be guided by an innovative plan introduced by the RMN referred to as the ’15 to 5 Transformation Program’. With an inventory of aging ships and decreasing budgets, the RMN has had to be creative in ensuring Malaysia’s current seapower capabilities are maintained while streamlining the fleet and saving costs. Referred to as the ’15 to 5’ plan, it refers to the current 15 classes of ships from seven different nations currently in possession by the RMN. Since this represents a large cost in terms of maintenance and operations, the plan seeks to streamline the fleet to only five classes, while decommissioning older ships. The five classes would be the New Generation Patrol Vessel, the Littoral Combat Ship, the Littoral Mission Ship, the Multirole Supply Ship, and a future expansion of its submarine fleet [28].

In 2013 the RMN announced the construction of six locally-built Second Generation Patrol Vessels (also known as the Littoral Combat Ship), which are effectively stealth frigates. A joint project between the Malaysian Boustead Naval Shipyard and the French DCNS, the ship’s hull will be based on the French Gowind class corvettes, but much larger. The ships will have an overall length of 111 meters and a displacement of 3,100 tons, and will be armed with anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles, alongside a helicopter with ASW capabilities. The first ship is expected to be commissioned in 2018 [29].

The most recent, and surprising, acquisition for the RMN has been the decision to purchase Littoral Mission Ships from China in early November of 2016. Four ships would be purchased, with two being constructed in China and the other two in Malaysia, with all ships to be constructed within 24 months of the deal being signed. Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak, speaking of the deal, noted that more ships may be purchased if they are found to have fulfilled the requirements of the RMN [30] [31]. Although some Western commentators were quick to point to the deal as suggestive of a Malaysia moving under the Chinese orbit, Jon Grevatt, a defense analyst for IHS Jane’s in Bangkok, argued that the choice could have simply been down to the fact that China was able to offer a cheaper option, at an estimated one third of the cost of a similar system from the West or South Korea [32].

As of yet, there is little information regarding the technical capabilities of the ships themselves, or what strategic role they will be envisioned to fulfill. Reuters mentions the ships are fast patrols vessels which can be equipped with both helicopter decks and missiles.[33] IHS Jane’s recently reported from Malaysia’s biennial defense exhibition the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition (LIMA) that the LMS would have an overall length of 68.8 meters and displace 680 tonnes. Their primary armament would be either a 20 mm or 30 mm naval gun, as well as two 12.7 mm machine guns. The vessels will also be able to carry 20 ft containerized mission modules on deck in the aft section, suggesting that the ships will be fitted with adaptability in mind, able to accommodate different mission packages depending on the strategic requirement. The Chief of the Royal Malaysian Navy noted that ships were designed for ‘many aspects of maritime security such as dealing with cross-border crime, piracy, anti-terrorism and search and rescue operations ’ [34] [35].

 

Conclusion

An analysis of these recent procurements as well as the larger ’15 to 5 Transformation Program’ suggest that Kuala Lumpur’s strategic direction as of now is focused less on ‘big ticket’ purchases designed for conventional forms of blue-water control, but rather cheaper, faster, and more lightly armed patrol vessels more equipped to deal with immediate security challenges in Malaysia’s littoral regions [36]. However, it be in the interest of the RMN to maintain a flexible fleet for any eventuality. Given that Malaysia has recently slashed its 2017 defense budget by over 13% (the largest single cutback since 1998) [37], it remains to be seen whether the RMN will be able to achieve its strategic aims in the near future.

 

Footnotes

  1. Dzirhan Mahadzir, ‘Finding the right operational mix a major challenge for the RMN’, Defense Review Asia, Volume 1, Number 8 (2007), 21
  2. ‘Chapter Six: Asia’, The Military Balance, Volume 116 (2016), 271
  3. Elina Noor, ‘The South China Sea Dispute: Options for Malaysia’, in Ian Storey and Lin Cheng-yi (ed), The South China Sea Dispute (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2016), p. 207
  4. Ibid
  5. Dzirhan Mahadzir, Malaysia is a country split into two halves (2013). Available at http://www.defencereviewasia.com/articles/208/Malaysia-is-a-country-split-into-two-halves [Accessed 2/3/2017]
  6. Ibid
  7. Elina Noor, ‘The South China Sea Dispute’, p. 206 - 207
  8. Center for Strategic and International Studies: Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 18 Maps that Explain Maritime Security in Asia (2014). Available at https://amti.csis.org/atlas/
  9. Prashanth Parameswaran, ‘Confronting Threats in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas: Opportunities and Challenges’, The Diplomat. 10 June 2016. Available online: http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/confronting-threats-in-the-sulu-sulawesi-seas-opportunities-and-challenges/
  10. Ibid
  11. Nyshka Chandran, ‘Forget Trump and China, piracy in in the Sulu Sea is a fresh threat to Asia trade’, CNBC. 22 November 2016. Available online: http://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/22/forget-trump-china-sulu-sea-piracy-is-threat-to-asia-trade.html
  12. Gregory Poling, Phoebe DePadua, and Jennifer Frentasia, ‘The Royal Army of Sulu Invades Malaysia’, Centre for Strategic and International Studies. 8 March 2013. Available online: https://www.csis.org/analysis/royal-army-sulu-invades-malaysia
  13. Najiah Najib, ‘Lahad Datu invasion: A panful memory of 2013’, Astro Arwani. Available online: http://english.astroawani.com/malaysia-news/lahad-datu-invasion-painful-memory-2013-27579
  14. Prashanth Parameswaran, ‘Confronting Threats in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas’
  15. Prashanth Parameswaran, Malaysia eyes submarine base expansion near South China Sea, The Diplomat. 28 January 2015. Available online: http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/malaysia-eyes-submarine-base-expansion-near-south-china-sea/
  16. Wilfred Pilo, ‘Navy mulls using Bintulu Port as defense base’, The Borneo Post. 7 May 2016. Available online: http://www.theborneopost.com/2016/05/07/navy-mulls-using-bintulu-port-as-defence-base/
  17. ‘Malaysia’s defense minister mulls over forward base to protect Sarawak waters’, The Borneo Bulletin. 10 April 2016. Available online: http://borneobulletin.com.bn/malaysias-defence-minister-mulls-over-forward-base-to-protect-sarawak-waters/
  18. Shahryar Pasandideh, ‘The Royal Malaysian Navy: An Assessment’ (2015). Available online: http://natoassociation.ca/the-royal-malaysian-navy-an-assessment/
  19. ‘Royal Malaysian Navy picks Danish radars for its Lekiu frigates’ (2016). Available online: http://navaltoday.com/2016/10/20/royal-malaysian-navy-picks-danish-radars-for-its-lekiu-frigates/
  20. Maki Catama, ‘Malaysian naval chief says priority is upgrades, but ASW helos, corvettes on shopping lists’ (2015). Available online: http://www.aseanmildef.com/2015/05/malaysian-naval-chief-says-priority-is.html
  21. Shahryar Pasandideh, ‘The Royal Malaysian Navy: An Assessment’
  22. Ibid
  23. Ibid
  24. ‘Kedah Class Offshore Patrol Vessels, Malaysia’, {2017). Available online: http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/kedah-class-patrol/
  25. Sharidan M. Ali, ‘Navy Vessel based on plug-and-play concept’, The Star, online edition. 31 July 2006. Available online: http://www.thestar.com.my/story/?file=%2f2006%2f7%2f31%2fmaritime%2f14976468&sec=maritime
  26. ‘Dude, Where’s My Missiles? Malaysia’s New Generation Patrol Vessels’, Full Frame. 9 April 2016. Available online: http://daisetsuzan.blogspot.my/2016/04/dude-wheres-my-missile-malaysias-new.html
  27. ‘Malaysia Submarine Capabilities’, 2016. Available online: http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/malaysia-submarine-capabilities/
  28. ‘Exclusive: Interview with Chief of Royal Malaysian Navy on ‘15 to 5” Transformation Programme’. Available online: http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/focus-analysis/naval-technology/4168-exclusive-interview-with-chief-of-royal-malaysian-navy-on-q15-to-5q-transformation-programme.html
  29. Dzirhan Mahadzir, ‘Malaysia is a country split into two halves’
  30. Chris Blake, ‘Malaysia to purchase four navy ships from China in landmark deal’, Bloomberg Markets. 2 November 2016. Available online: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-02/malaysia-to-purchase-four-navy-ships-from-china-in-landmark-deal
  31. Lokman Mansour, ‘Malaysia buys navy vessels from China’, The New Strait Times, Internet edition. 1 November 2016. Available online: http://www.nst.com.my/news/2016/11/185136/malaysia-buys-navy-vessels-china
  32. Chris Blake, ‘Malaysia to purchase four navy ships from China’
  33. Tom Allard and Joseph Sipalan, ‘Malaysia to buy navy vessels from China in blow to U.S.’, Reuters, Internet edition. 28 October 2016. Available online: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-china-defence-idUSKCN12S0WA
  34. ‘Malaysia aims to replace all 50 ships in navy’, The Straits Times, Internet edition. 22nd March 2017. Available online: http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysia-aims-to-replace-all-50-ships-in-navy
  35. Ridzwan Rahmat, ‘Lima 2017: CSIC discloses further details of Littoral Mission Ship proposal for Malaysia’, IHS Jane’s 360. 21 March 2017. Available online: http://www.janes.com/article/68870/lima-2017-csic-discloses-further-details-of-littoral-mission-ship-proposal-for-malaysia
  36. Koh Swee Lean Collin, ‘Malaysia’s Navy Deal with China: Meeting a Complex Security Challenge’, RSIS Commentary, 271 (2016). Available online: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/CO16271.pdf
  37. Gordon Arthur, Malaysia slashes 2017 defence budget’ (2016). Available online: https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/defence-notes/malaysia-slashes-2017-defence-budget/


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